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CASE COMMENT  
 
Case Facts  
Mr Hunt was a wealthy investor and beneficially owned the company, Swynson Ltd, whose primary 
activity was ‘lending money to risky businesses’. 1   On the 31st of October 2006 Mr Hunt caused  
Swynson to lend £15m to Evo Medical Solutions Ltd (EMSL) for a period of a year. The purpose of the 
loan was to buy-out an American company called Evo. Before entering into the transaction Swynson 
and EMSL jointly instructed a firm of accountants Hurst, Morrison Thompson (HMT) to carry out due 
diligence on Evo prior to the buy out. The report failed to identify financial problems with Evo and it 
was argued if HMT had carried out they task properly the transaction would not have gone ahead.2 
During 2007 Evo began to show financial problems and as a result Swynson lent a further £1.75m in 
2007 and £3m in 2008,3 it is also important to note that in this year Mr Hunt became a controlling 
shareholder of EMSL with 85% Equity. In December of 2008 the 2006 and 2007 loans were 
refinanced with Mr Hunt personally due to the fact Mr Hunt did not want a non-performing loan on 
Swynson’s books,4 in addition to this as Mr Hunt was a controlling shareholder with the potential for 
interest, there was a potential tax bill of around £300,0005 per annum, therefore refinancing on 
these grounds prime facie appeared to benefit both Swynson and Mr Hunt.  
In 2012 Swynson and Mr Hunt brought the claim against HMT for damages of £16.157m. The claim 
being that Swynson & Mr Hunt were due damages as investments were made on the strength of the 
HMT report. HMT, however, argued that as EMSL had repaid their loans, albeit with a further 
personal loan from Mr Hunt, that no loss was suffered.  
In response to this, four points were argued6  
(i) The December 2008 refinancing was res inter alios acta and did not effect the amount of 
loss.  
(ii) If the loss was not recoverable by Swynson than it was recoverable by Mr Hunt on a duty 
of care argument. 
(iii) Swynson were entitled to recover on the principle of transferred loss. 
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(iv) HMT had been unjustly enriched by Mr Hunts funds to pay off the initial loan from 
Swynson.  
 
In the first instance the before Rose J, the judge accepted point i and damages of £15m were 
awarded7, with £15m being the cap on the letter of engagement.  The Court of Appeal also felt the 
transaction could be regarded as res inter alios acta and agreed with Rose J.  
 
Question being asked to the court  
What happens if a claimant is owed a duty, but the loss arising from the breach of that duty is 
suffered by someone else; can the claimant recover that loss and if so in what circumstances?  
 
Background on separate legal entity.  
The Supreme Court commented in the present case that “the distinct legal personality has been a 
fundamental feature of English commercial law for a century and a half, but that has never stopped 
businessmen from treating their companies’ as indistinguishable from themselves”.8 Lord Sumption 
makes the observation that despite legal separation between beneficial shareholders and their 
respective companies, the owners are treating their companies as  an extension of themselves.   This 
principle of separate entity splits opinion, as some beneficial shareholders appear to prefer the 
protection when it benefits them, however in the present case, shareholders are asking the Court to 
consider them as one and the same, sometimes referred to as reverse veil piercing.  Separate legal 
entity specifically for ‘one man companies’ was first considered in Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd9 
where the Court asserted companies, big or small, were to have the protection of limited liability 
and separate legal entity.  
The limited liability principle has predominately been tested in company law matters and, largely, in 
matters of insolvency10 where shareholders have avoided liability due to the principles of separate 
legal entity. In recent years tortious matters involving duty of care have also been considered within 
the principles of separate legal entity,11 likewise with shareholders avoiding liability on the grounds 
of separate legal entity. In the highly-publicised case of Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd and others12 
the defendant put their assets in the ownership of a company they owned and controlled to prevent 
his assets being counted in their divorce settlement. Despite the defendant in Prest being 
unsuccessful, this provides insight into the lengths some individuals are willing to go to avoid 
liability.  
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The present case is therefore the opposite of the norm, to seek to persuade the Court to lift this veil 
to see the beneficial ownership of the company. An individual, through unfortunate circumstance 
has suffered a loss whilst trading as a ‘single economic unit’ between themselves and their company.  
In this case, the beneficial owner of company is wanting to disregard the principles of separate legal 
entity. It is therefore a case of significance as it is a case, albeit outside the realms of black letter 
company law, where the party with the protection of separate legal entity is wanting this protection 
waived.  
 
Supreme Court Decision 
The Supreme court considered the principles of transferred loss and unjust enrichment before 
concluding that neither Mr Hunt or Swynson had a claim which can be maintained against HMT13. 
The reasoning behind this conclusion appears to be based upon the issue of loss, as EMSL repaid 
their initial loan to Swynson, therefore, there was no loss in the literal sense of the word and thus no 
damages to follow. This was decided despite the fact Mr Hunt controlled Swynson and refinanced 
the loan specifically for this purpose. This case could be argued as somewhat harsh and literal 
approach, as Mr Hunt personally or via companies he controlled is out of pocket, and the literal 
interpretation of separate personality has resulted in a loss of damages despite the HMT report 
being negligent and resulting in the initial loan.  
This case could, therefore, limit the circumstances in which unjust enrichment is considered within 
company law. The Court found that there was no doubt that HMT were indirectly enriched14 but 
enrichment as the only element is not sufficient. There is also a requirement that the enrichment 
must be at the expense of the claimant15 and for this to happen, both parties would have had to deal 
directly with one another which they had not in this case. Therefore, for unjust enrichment to be 
successful there are four elements which must be satisfied. 16 
1) Has the defendant been enriched or benefited? 
2) Was the enrichment at the expense of the claimant? 
3) Was the enrichment unjust? 
4) If all elements are satisfied, are there any defences? 
 
Relevance from a company law perspective  
Mr Hunt was arguably seeking the corporate veil to be lifted to benefit himself to show the Court 
that Swynson and himself were one at the same from an economical point of view. If Swynson were 
removed from the equation and the initial loan made between Mr Hunt and EMSL then the outcome 
would have been largely different, however, the fact that a company and its owner are treated 
separately in law resulted in Mr Hunt, being unable to further his claim. The Courts’ resistance to 
allow Mr Hunt to have this veil lifted, strengthens the principles of separate legal entity. Just 
                                                          
13  Lowick Rose LLP (in liquidation) v Swynson Ltd & Anor [2017] UKSC 32 [121] 
14 Ibid [57] 
15 Ibid [58] 
16 Ibid [56] 
because the beneficial owner wants to disregard the veil to benefit themselves does not 
automatically mean it will be lifted. This stance is of importance because it provides clarity that the 
principles of separate entity works both ways, both when the beneficial owner wants separation and 
when they do not, and that the beneficial owners are not free to choose.  
Whilst this case involves asset finance and refinancing of debt, it can be argued to have a binding 
effect on the principles of separate legal entity and further strengthening the principles outline in 
Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd 17. The Prest case was a Supreme Court decision, in which it was 
stated that the court may “pierce the corporate veil in the absence of specific statutory authority to 
do so”18.  Interestingly in this present case, despite being heard by the same leading Judge, Lord 
Sumption, the Supreme Court have held that even at the express request of the shareholder ‘behind 
the veil’ to have the veil lifted, that this request is not sufficient to set aside the principles of 
separate legal entity thereby strengthening the original position seen in Salomon. 
The case of Prest is regarded as a case which has “redefined what piercing the veil actually means”19 
and with the introduction of the concealment and evasion principle has codified the way in which 
the arguments of agency, economic entity and the sham and façade arguments are considered.  This 
present case draws parallels to DHN Food Distributors v Tower Hamlets LBC20 & Woolfson v 
Strathclyde RC21 in which both cases also attempted to permit veil peircing to allow land 
compensation.   The present case could be argued a landmark decision post the Prest decision as it 
specifically considers requests to have the veil disregarded by the beneficial owners. The Court’s 
refusal to accept this request is not only in line with Prest it also reaffirms the earlier decision or 
Woolfson post the landmark Prest case.    
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